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AbstrAct: This paper presents a doctrinal review of the rule of admissi-
bility of evidence in the criminal process of continental Europe, which 
can be understood narrowly as applying exclusively to the question of 
acceptability, i.e. determination what evidence can be admitted. This 
rule can also be understood in broad terms and applied to determine not 
only the admissibility of evidence but also its relevance and adequacy. 
Much attention was paid to the functions performed by the admissibility 
rule, especially its guarantee function. The state of scientific discussion 
on the recognition of unlawfully obtained evidence as “inadmissible 
evidence”, and the author’s views on this issue were also presented.
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resumo: Este artigo apresenta uma revisão doutrinária sobre a regra da 
admissibilidade da prova no processo penal da Europa continental, que pode 
ser entendida estritamente como aplicável somente à questão da admissibilidade, 
ou seja, da determinação de qual prova pode ser admitida. Essa regra pode 
também ser entendida em termos amplos e aplicada para determinar não somente 
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a admissibilidade da prova, mas também a sua relevância e pertinência. 
Muita atenção foi direcionada para as funções desempenhadas pelas regras 
de admissibilidade, especialmente a sua função de garantia. Também são 
expostos o estado da discussão científica no reconhecimento de provas 
obtidas ilicitamente e a posição do autor sobre a questão.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: processo penal; direito probatório; admissibilidade da 
prova; legalidade dos atos estatais; postulado de integridade moral do 
sistema de justiça.
1. IntroductIon
The rule of admissibility of evidence is an important procedural 
concept. The rule expresses the norm that only evidence that is admissible 
by applicable law may be introduced into criminal proceedings. Provisions 
of the law of evidence which define admissible and inadmissible evidence 
should be understood in broad terms. The notion of “applicable law” 
consists of statutory provisions, usually expressed as codes of criminal 
procedure, the provisions of applicable constitutions, which generally 
contain clauses prohibiting the use of torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, as well as corporal punishment. The notion also 
extends to provisions of international law, including that of the European 
Union3 and the Council of Europe4. 
3 The law of the European Union is applied in national legal systems in accor-
dance with the principles of primacy, direct effect and indirect effect of EU 
law. According to the principle of primacy (supremacy) of European Union 
law over domestic laws of EU Member States, in the situation of a conflict be-
tween a rule of national law of a given Member State and a rule of European 
Union law, priority must be given to the rule of EU law. In such a situation, the 
primacy principle prevents the application of the rule which forms part of the 
national legal system of the Member State concerned. The principle of primacy 
applies to all legally binding sources of European Union law: its primary and 
secondary legislation, as well as international agreements concluded by the 
European Union with third countries. The provisions of the European Union 
law falling within the scope of national laws of evidence include, in particular, 
framework decisions and directives of the Parliament and of the Council.
4 A key international instrument affecting national laws of evidence is the Europe-
an Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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The law of evidence specifies that only certain measures of 
evidence5 are admissible, namely those including evidence given by 
persons, i.e. testimony given by the accused and witness and reports 
drafted by expert witnesses. National procedural laws do not define the 
measures of evidence obtained from what is known as “material sources of 
evidence”. The notion and classification of material measures of evidence 
were formulated by the science of evidence, based on the analysis of 
evidentiary procedures permitted by law, in particular the examination of 
a person, location and objects or the procedural experiment. By permitting 
the examination of a location, person or object and the carrying out of a 
procedural experiment, the law permits the measures of evidence which 
are obtained in the course of those evidentiary procedures. The law of 
evidence does not explicitly define the material measures of evidence 
despite the fact that such measures of evidence are established by statutory 
provisions that govern evidentiary procedures. National procedural laws 
permit the use of material measures of evidence but do not define what 
a material measure of evidence is or specify the existing types of such 
measures. National law merely provides that material measures of evidence 
comprise any measures of evidence obtained from the examination 
of a location, person and objects, a procedural experiment and other 
evidentiary procedures specified by law. Consequently, it is entirely 
possible that a measure yet unknown (unnamed), which at some point 
will become accessible through examination in consequence of scientific 
and technological progress, may be classified as evidence in the future. In 
such a case, such evidence should be considered admissible under law6. 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, adopted in Rome on 4th 
November 1950. Available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/conven-
tion_eng.pdf. (access: December 20, 2020). Hereinafter: the ECHR.
5 In an attempt to address the ambiguity of the notion of “evidence”, in this pa-
per I use that term to refer to both sources and measures of evidence; a source 
of evidence is a person or object from which the evidence originates, whereas 
a measure of evidence is the medium that contains information about the facts 
to be proved, e.g. testimony of the accused, a witness’s testimony or a report 
of an expert witness, features and characteristics of an object; the notion of 
“evidence” understood strictly embodies a measure of evidence.
6 Throughout the history of the criminal process many measures of evidence 
have “appeared” thanks to the development of science, e.g. fingerprints, trace 
evidence, DNA traces.
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On the other hand, in most cases, the law of evidence clearly 
indicates what evidence is considered inadmissible. Such restrictions on 
the admissibility of evidence are expressed by “evidentiary prohibitions”, 
i.e. norms prohibiting proof of specific facts (e.g. the course of the 
deliberations and voting on a verdict), proof of facts by means of specific 
types of evidence (e.g. testimony of a lawyer representing the accused) 
and the use of certain methods of obtaining evidence (e.g. torture or 
corporal punishment). 
The rule of admissibility of evidence is an important guarantee. 
According to that rule, the facts relevant to the determination of the 
accused’s guilt can only be established by means of legally admissible 
evidence. National legislators have developed procedural laws of evidence 
in a way that enables the carrying out of evidentiary activities (understood 
as the conduct of participants in evidentiary procedures) exclusively in 
a pre-determined manner. By doing so, national legislators legitimise the 
conduct of the participants in the process as evidentiary activities carried 
out as part of criminal proceedings. Thus, the method of conducting 
evidentiary proceedings, i.e. the collection, recording and taking of 
evidence, may not be discretionary but is strictly regulated. If evidence is 
acquired and used in an unlawful manner, law enforcement authorities gain 
an unfair advantage over the accused. Instead of resorting to dishonest, and 
hence unfair, conduct that is not legitimised by the law, law enforcement 
authorities should use the capabilities and resources that the state has 
already put at their disposal. As a guarantee, the rule of admissibility of 
evidence ensures that a citizen (the accused) knows how the evidentiary 
proceedings will be conducted. The awareness that factual findings in 
criminal proceedings will be determined based on evidence admissible 
under law provides the accused with the opportunity to predict what 
decisions may be taken by criminal justice bodies and effectively defend 
themselves against prosecution. On the other hand, if law enforcement 
authorities could determine the facts based on evidence that is inadmissible 
and thus contrary to the law of evidence, the defence of the accused’s 
case would be difficult or even impossible. 
Notably, the rule of admissibility of evidence is an important 
safeguard of the accused’s legal interests. Indeed, it draws the boundaries 
of the accused’s “protective sphere”, which must remain free from any 
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interference by criminal justice bodies. In such a way, the accused is 
protected against unlawful violations of their realm of permissible 
behaviour and freedom and economic activity which could otherwise 
result from the use of inadmissible evidence. The rule of admissibility of 
evidence also serves as a safeguard of public interest. After all, it defines 
the sphere of permitted procedural activities for state authorities, and thus 
sets the limits for acceptable interference with the rights and freedoms 
of participants in criminal proceedings.
Another guarantee provided by this rule concerns the prevention 
of the arbitrary conduct on the part of criminal justice bodies, which, in 
turn, ensures that the rights and freedoms of a citizen (the accused) are 
respected. Thanks to this guarantee, the accused is not at the mercy of 
law enforcement authorities, the public prosecutor or the court.
2. the Importance od the rule od admIssIbIlIty of evIdence 
The rule of admissibility of evidence is a legal construct 
deliberately designed and developed by national legislators to achieve 
specific procedural objectives and used to achieve these objectives. In 
consequence of the above, the offence, its perpetrator and the accused’s 
guilt can only be established on the basis of facts established following 
the taking of legally admissible evidence. 
The rule of admissibility of evidence is connected with the right 
of the parties to criminal proceedings to request that evidence be taken 
by a criminal justice body (the court during the trial and, in pre-trial 
proceedings, by the prosecutor or other competent authority). The taking 
of evidence is the activity that involves including in the criminal process 
measures of evidence originating from sources of evidence. This is done 
by means of evidentiary procedures, which may involve an interview of 
the accused or a witness, examination of a person, location or object, a 
search of a person or premises, etc. Although different entities may be 
entitled to request the taking of evidence, the initiative in evidence-taking 
may always be undertaken ex officio or at the request of an authorized 
entity, if a law so permits. The legal design of initiative in evidence-taking 
depends on the adopted model of the criminal process and the underlying 
model of evidentiary proceedings, which may be based on the inquisitorial 
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or adversarial principle and on the principle of truth. Depending on the 
model, criminal justice bodies and parties to the proceedings have a 
different impact on evidentiary proceedings. In a model which is based 
(entirely or predominantly) on the inquisitorial principle, the scope of 
evidentiary proceedings, and thus the determination of facts, will be 
significantly influenced by criminal justice bodies (the police, prosecutor, 
court). In a model based (entirely or predominantly) on the adversarial 
principle, evidentiary proceedings at the main trial are conducted by the 
parties (the prosecution and the accused), while the court’s authority to 
take evidence ex officio is limited. 
In contemporary criminal processes of continental Europe, 
evidence may be taken if the following conditions are met: (1) the evidence 
must be admissible, (2) the fact to be proven must be relevant to the 
resolution of the case; (3) the evidence must be relevant to establish 
factuality of a given circumstance; (4) it is possible to take the evidence. 
Sometimes, a further condition is added, namely that the taking of evidence 
must not be intended to protract the proceedings.
The rule of admissibility of evidence can therefore be understood 
narrowly as applying exclusively to the question of acceptability, i.e. 
determination what evidence can be admitted. This rule can also be 
understood in broad terms and applied to determine not only the 
admissibility of evidence but also its relevance and adequacy. 
The rule of admissibility of evidence in the criminal process of 
continental Europe is determined by three elements:
a) the principle of truth, which expresses the requirement that 
the findings of facts must reflect the reality,
b) the principle of expediency, which requires that proceedings 
be conducted swiftly and that the case be resolved within a 
reasonable time,
c) the rights and freedoms of the accused and of the persons 
giving evidence, which lay down boundaries that must be 
respected by criminal justice bodies collecting evidence and 
introducing it into the criminal process.
The right to initiate evidentiary procedures was introduced in 
the 19th-century criminal codifications and was associated with the 
recognition of the accused as a subject rather than an object of the criminal 
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process. However, the principles governing the introduction of evidence 
in the criminal process, including the rule of admissibility of evidence, 
were only defined in 20th-century criminal codifications. This does not 
mean that there were no earlier rules on the admissibility of evidence 
in the criminal process. Changes of measures of evidence and principles 
governing the introduction of evidence accompanied the development 
of the criminal process. However, the rules of the criminal process of 
continental Europe have repeatedly established subjective and objective 
limitations concerning the proving of facts relevant to the resolution 
of the case. For a long time, the law provided that certain categories of 
persons have no capacity to be witnesses in criminal proceedings. The 
evidence obtained from such persons was inadmissible. The law also 
defined measures that could not constitute evidence. It was inadmissible 
to prove facts through such measures.
3.  the development of the rules on admIssIbIlIty of 
evIdence – hIstorIcal approach 
3.1. Ancient Greece 
In ancient Greece,7 Aristotle divided the means available to a 
speaker in court into pisteis entechnoi, i.e. means dependent on the art 
of rhetoric, and pisteis atechnoi, i.e. means independent of rhetorical 
proficiency (Retoryka (The Rhetoric) 1355 b 35). In order to be 
considered as belonging to the art of rhetoric, means of persuasion 
needed to originate from that art. According to Aristotle, witnesses’ 
testimonies, evidence given under torture and written statements did 
not belong to the art (of rhetoric)8. 
7 See: BONNER, Robert J. Evidence in Athenian Court. Chicago 1905; LIPSIUS, 
Justus Herman. Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren. Leipzig 1905-1915. p. 
866-900; HARRISON, Alick Robin Walsham, The Law of Athens. Procedure. 
Oxford 1971, p. 133-154; MACDOWELL, Douglas M. The Law in Classical 
Athens. London, 1978. p. 242-247.
8 See: ARYSTOTELES. Retoryka. In: ARYSTOTELES. Dzieła wszystkie, v. 6. 
Warszawa 2001.
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An exhaustive list of pisteis atechnoi, provided by the Stagirite 
elsewhere in The Rhetoric (1375 a 24 f), includes laws, witnesses 
testimonies, evidence given under torture, contracts, oaths. It was a 
common principle to listen to both parties to the dispute and to give 
the accused a chance to justify themselves. The Athenian oath sworn 
by judges included the promise to hear the accuser, the accused and the 
latter’s counsel9. It appears that the oath was not necessary where the 
case was self-evident10. Therefore, statements of the accused given during 
the trial should be added to the list of pisteis atechnoi. 
In the legal process of ancient Greece, parties to a dispute were 
obliged to present the law (nomos, nomoi) or resolutions of the popular 
assembly (psephisma, psephismata) on which they relied. The parties had 
to find and rewrite such instruments on their own. Persons invoking a 
non-existing law faced the death penalty11. Wills, contracts, books of 
accounts were among documents constituting procedural evidence. 
Testimonies of witnesses (martyria, martyriai) were the crucial proof 
during a trial.12 In Athens, only free adult males had the privilege of 
testifying. As stated by most commentators, female Athenian citizens 
could not give evidence during the trial.13 The testimony of slaves could 
constitute evidence only if extracted by torture. It was then considered 
more credible than the testimony of a free man (martyriai). 
Similarly, persons who had lost their Athenian citizenship could 
not serve as witnesses14. Still, foreigners15 could give testimony in public16 
and private17 cases. Parties to a dispute could not be witnesses in their 
9 See: DEMOSTENES. Przeciw Timokratesowi. p. 149-151.
10 See: ARYSTOFANES. Osy. p. 919.
11 See: DEMOSTENES. XXVI 24.
12 For a more detailed discussion, see: LEISI, Ernst. Der Zeuge im attischen 
Recht. Frauenfeld 1907; MIRHADY, David C. Athens’ Democratic Witness. 
Phoenix, 56/3, p. 255-274, 2002.
13 See: GAGARIN, Michael. Women in Athebian Court. Dike 1, p. 43, 1998.
14 See: DEMOSTENES. XXI 95.
15 See: HARRISON, Alick Robin Walsham, The Law..., p. 138.
16 See: DEMOSTENES. XXXV 14; HYPEREJDES. V 33.
17 See: DEMOSTENES. XIX 146; AJSCHINES. II 155.
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own case18. However, testimony in support of a litigant’s case could be 
given by persons who spoke on their behalf (synegoroi).19 Relatives of 
a party to the proceedings were allowed to testify. It is assumed that 
Athenian law prevented jurors hearing a given case from acting in the 
capacity of witnesses20.
3.2. Ancient rome 
In Roman law, there were no statutory rules for dealing with 
evidence. The Roman theory of evidence was not developed to a degree 
sufficient to fully restate the principles of evidentiary proceedings. The 
majority of sources concerning evidence in criminal trials of the Republican 
era appear in court speeches, which are devoid of theoretical references. 
Roman law provided for no list of admissible measures of evidence. A piece 
of evidence, proof (probatio), understood as a measure of evidence was 
defined as the information about circumstances relevant to the adjudication 
of a dispute. It was the parties who were required to present and take 
evidence. Neither the judge presiding over the trial (quaesitor) nor the 
multi-person tribunal had any participation in the taking of evidence. 
The burden of proof (onus probandi) rested on whoever made the claim. 
Roman law did not introduce a list of admissible measures of 
evidence. Consequently, there were no restrictions on the admissibility 
of evidence. The only known categorisation of evidence, the one cited 
by Quintilian21 and derived from Aristotle, was based on the distinction 
18 See: DEMOSTENES, VII 46.
19 See e.g.: ISAJOS, XII 4; AJSCHINES, II 170.
20 See: HARRISON, Alick Robin Walsham, The Law..., p. 138.
21 Quintilian, or Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, c. 35– c. 96 AD, Roman rhetori-
cian and rhetoric educator, advocate. The author of The Institutes of Oratory; 
or, Education of an Orator. In Twelve Books (Latin: Institutionis oratoriae libri 
XII), which presents the theory of rhetoric, remarks about foundational ed-
ucation and a depiction of the ideal teacher. In Book V of the Institutio Ora-
toria, Quintilian presents the types of evidence in the Roman legal process, 
including evidence derived from the court proceedings themselves, public 
opinion and rumours, evidence extracted by torture, testimonies of official 
documents, oaths, witness testimonies, evidence derived from laws, circum-
stantial evidence. 
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between artificial proofs (probationes artificiales) and natural proofs 
(probationes inartificiales)22. According to Quintilian, artificial proofs 
originate from the speaker himself, i.e. the prosecutor and the advocate, 
are a product of their rhetorical skills. The above category was said to 
include arguments, which in practice denoted circumstantial evidence23. 
Natural proofs consisted of evidence obtained from sources external 
to the speaker, which included „appropriate” measures of evidence, 
namely those intended to demonstrate the existence or non-existence of 
certain past events. Probationes inartificiales included witness statements, 
documents, etc. 
The key evidence was the testimony of witnesses (testimonia). A 
special type of witness was the laudator (praiser), i.e. a character witness 
called during the trial to give verbal or written testimony in support of 
the accused’s case, his conduct and lifestyle. The laudator’s testimony 
constituted a measure of evidence. Another type of witness was the index 
(informant), an accomplice who confessed to the crime. An index received 
immunity or even a reward. An index was questioned at the preparatory 
stage of the proceedings and then as a witness during the trial. Expert 
witnesses were not considered a separate source of evidence; they were 
treated as witnesses, albeit of a special kind. 
As a rule, only freemen could be witnesses, although this 
condition was not formally defined until the 5th century AD24. The 
criminal process of the Republican era did not provide for any common, 
statutory restrictions on the admissibility of testimony on the grounds 
of sex, societal status or age of a witness, their foreign origins or even 
22 In Book V of the Institutio Oratoria 5.1.1. (Liber Quintus) Quintus writes: “Ac 
prima quidem illa partitio ab Aristotele tradita consensum fere omnium meruit, 
alias esse probationes quas extra dicendi rationem acciperet orator, alias quas ex 
causa traheret ipse et quodam modo gigneret; ideoque illas atechnous, id est in-
artificiales, has entechnous id est artificiales, vocaverunt” (To begin with it may 
be noted that the division laid down by Aristotle has met with almost universal 
approval. It is to the effect that there are some proofs adopted by the orator which 
lie outside the art of speaking, and others which he himself deduces or, if I may 
use the term, begets out of his case. The former therefore have been styled inarti-
ficial proofs, the latter or artificial.).
23 See: LITEWSKI Wiesław. Rzymski proces karny. Kraków 2003, p. 93. 
24 C. 4, 20, 10.
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indecency or previous convictions. Some scholars present the view that 
children were customarily excluded from testifying in cases against their 
parents25, but others argue that such a relationship was merely a ground 
for a refusal of testimony, known already in the times of the Republic. 
Paulus’s testimony that a son is not a suitable witness in his father’s case, 
and the father – in the son’s case26 (or, more broadly, in a case concerning 
the daughter, grandson or grandfather),27 is sometimes interpreted as 
referring to testimony given in support rather than to the detriment of, a 
party to the dispute28. 
The first formal subjective restrictions on the admissibility of 
testimony were introduced by Emperor Augustus,29 who resolved that 
in cases involving the charge of vis, no testimony for the accuser’s case 
may be given by slaves freed by the defendant (or the defendant’s father), 
minors, persons convicted of a public offence and not reinstated to 
their previous status, offenders held in shackles or in prison, persons 
fighting wild animals (bestiarii), female prostitutes, as well as all persons 
convicted, or even accused, of accepting a financial advantage for giving 
or refraining from giving testimony. 
According to Ulpian (as quoted in the Collatio)30, the list of persons 
strictly excluded from testimony also comprised of freedwomen of the 
accused, the accused’s ascendants or freed slaves (of both sexes) of any 
of the accused, or the accused’s ascendants, any slaves freed by the above 
freedmen (or freedwomen), men who hired themselves as gladiators or 
bestiarii (with the exception of javelin throwers), as well as persons who 
have appeared or were to appear in public.
It was also pointed out that the prosecution should not appoint 
as a witness a person previously accused in a public trial or a person who 
25 See: ZUMPT, August Wilhelm. Das Criminalrecht der Römischen Republik. 
Berlin 1869, p. 256 and 267-268.
26 D. 22, 5, 9.
27 See D. 50, 16, 201.
28 MANFREDINI, Arnoldo D. La testimonianza del liberto contro il patrono nel 
processo criminale di età classica. In: Studi in onore di Arnaldo Biscardi. v. 3. 
Milano 1982, p. 234.
29 D. 22, 5, 3, 5.
30 Collatio 9, 2.
104 | Skorupka, Jerzy.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 1, p. 93-122, jan.-abr. 2021. 
was under the age of 2031, (although the Lex Iulia de vi refers to the age 
of maturity)32. In addition, no person who has already testified against 
the accused could be appointed as a witness for the accused33. Persons 
suspected of bias, in particular, those “brought by the accuser from their 
own home”34, as well as those who have fallen into infamy as a result of 
their lifestyle35 were also disqualified as witnesses.
Moreover, judges hearing the case, advocates36 and jurors were 
generally disqualified as witnesses. There was also a rule prohibiting a 
party from acting as a witness in their case.37
During the Republican period, the accused’s statements, including 
their admission of guilt (confessio), did not constitute evidence. The 
accused’s admission of guilt resulted in the proceedings ending immediately 
with conviction. However, Seneca, who lived in the 1st century AD, 
expressed the principle that both parties to a dispute should be heard: 
“Quicunque aliquid statuerit, parte inaudita altera, Aequum licet statuerit, 
haud aequus fuerit”38.
During the Imperial period, the confessio obtained the status of 
evidence. As such, the admission of guilt was required to be examined 
in the light of other evidence gathered, subject to the proviso that if 
the prosecution’s allegations are not supported by other evidence, the 
accused’s admission of guilt should not be treated as evidence of a crime 
the accused has allegedly committed39. 
31 D. 22, 5, 20. Cf. GIUFFRE, Vincenzo. La repressione criminale nell ‘esperienza 
romana, Napoli 1997, p. 152.
32 D. 22, 5, 3, 5 and Coll. 9, 2, 2.
33 D. 22, 5, 23. A different rule is expressed in C. 4, 20, 13. 
34 D. 22, 5, 24; Coll. 9, 3. 
35 Collatio 9, 3. 
36 D. 22, 5, 25. See also ZUMPT August Wilhelm. Das Criminalrecht…, p. 
271-272.
37 D. 22, 5, 10.
38 “Whoever shall have determined anything without hearing the other side, 
may have decreed justly, yet he will not have been just.” SENECA, Medea, 
Poznań 2000, p. 199-200.
39 D. 48, 18, 1, 17; D. 48, 18, 1, 27.
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During the reign of Emperor Constantine, the spontaneous 
confessio was treated as a sufficient basis for conviction in cases of capital 
offences, namely adultery, manslaughter or witchcraft. A conviction could 
be handed down also in the absence of the perpetrator’s confession, if 
there were consistent statements of persons subjected to torture or 
made by witnesses40. It was permissible to torture the accused in order 
to obtain their confessio.
Public opinion views (rumores) had a major influence on the 
content of criminal judgments41. Such views constituted one of the 
measures of evidence. 
3.3. medievAl criminAl Process And rules of Admissibility of evidence 
In the early medieval process, no separate procedures were 
established for private and criminal cases, because both were based on a 
sense of harm suffered by a party, regardless of the nature of the harmful 
deed. In this context, all proceedings had features of a criminal trial.
Evidentiary proceedings were conducted not before but after 
the judgment was delivered. The proceedings took place out of court 
but in the presence of the opposing party. The person obliged to take 
evidence (usually the respondent/accused) thus had to solemnly swear 
to the opposing party (the claimant) that they would take evidence. 
Accordingly, the claimant/accuser had to acknowledge the result of the 
evidence-taking process. Anyone who failed to comply with the obligation 
to take evidence was outlawed. All types of evidence were regulated in 
a strictly formalistic fashion. These included the confession of guilt, 
the apprehension of the perpetrator in the act, oaths, the ordeals and 
witness testimony. 
40 C. 9, 47, 16.
41 In Book V of the Institutio Oratoria (5.1.2, Liber Quintus) Quintilian writes: 
“Ex illo priore genere sunt praeiudicia, rumores, tormenta, tabulae, ius iuran-
dum, testes, in quibus pars maxima contentionum forensium consistit. Sed ut 
ipsa per se carent arte, ita summis eloquentiae viribus et adlevanda sunt plerum-
que et refellenda. Quare mihi videntur magnopere damnandi qui totum hoc genus 
a praeceptis removerant.”
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The tribal period is considered the period of the emergence of 
ordeals (iudicia Dei), which were based on the belief that a deity would 
identify the guilty party. Recourse to this measure prevented other 
evidence from being used, as the ordeal was considered definitive proof. 
These included the trial by hot water (iudicium aquae ferventis) and the 
trial by hot iron (iudicium ferri candentis) and trial by cold water (iudicium 
aquae frigidae).
Under Germanic law, every free man could be a witness. However, 
a witness was required to possess property, at least movable, probably 
because of the necessity of paying a fine for perjury. A tenant sitting on 
someone else’s land could not serve as a witness, even though he was 
granted the right to act as an oath-helper. A witness was also required to be 
settled in the county where the case was adjudicated. Perjurers, offenders 
sentenced to death and later pardoned, minors, women and persons 
deprived of honour did not have the capacity to serve as witnesses. The 
category of persons deprived of honour included comedians, jesters, men 
cohabitating with a concubine, sons of unmarried mothers and prostitutes. 
The Swabian Mirror allowed the use of torture if there was 
circumstantial evidence (Indizien) that an accused person may have 
committed an offence, based on the credible testimony of one or two 
witnesses. After receiving such testimony, the court had one month to 
obtain the accused’s confession to the commission of the alleged offence 
by means of torture. Over time, courts have been using torture in an 
increasingly arbitrary fashion, merely based on a suspicion of commission 
of a crime.
3.4. rules of evidence of the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina
Adoption by the Reichstag (on 27 June 1532) of the Constitutio 
Criminalis Carolina (the Carolina, or “CCC”), has brought a new, strong 
impetus for the development of the theory of evidence, connected with the 
inquisitive type of criminal proceedings popularised by this codification. 
The system of formal proof envisaged in the Carolina has replaced the 
existing system of evidence in the accusatory process. The legal (formal) 
theory of evidence laid down in the Carolina determined the hierarchy 
and worth of individual types of evidence and set the requirements for 
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valuable evidence. The accused ceased to be a subject of the proceedings 
and became the object of the proceedings.
According to the Carolina, not only witness statements and 
documents but also circumstantial evidence, suspicions and conjectures 
could be accepted as evidence. If the accused could not prove his innocence 
and did not confess, the judge ordered them to be tortured. The torture-
induced testimony given by the accused needed to be confirmed by 
testimony given after the torture. Only the admission of guilt obtained 
under the procedure provided for by Carolina was considered “complete” 
evidence and sufficient grounds for a conviction (art. 60 CCC).
The Carolina required that a witness should have a good reputation 
and therefore prohibited convicted perjurers from serving as witnesses. 
Furthermore, the codification did not allow unknown and hired witnesses.
The legal theory of evidence that governed the inquisitorial 
criminal process applied to all evidence used in the process. On the one 
hand, it has curtailed then-existing judicial arbitrariness related to the 
examination of evidence. On the other hand, the legal theory of evidence 
determined, in a rigid and top-down manner, what evidence the judge 
had to believe and what they had to refuse to believe and established 
what conclusions and legal consequences the judge had to draw from the 
evidence presented, regardless of their personal judgement. 
The principles provided for in the inquisitorial criminal process 
did not apply to witchcraft trials, as such proceedings were considered 
to be taken against Satan himself, while the accused witch was perceived 
merely as Satan’s victim and supine tool. No rules of the legal theory 
of evidence were followed in witchcraft trials. Even the testimony of 
children had full evidentiary value. No restrictions concerning the use of 
torture existed in such proceedings and presumptions could be admitted 
as evidence. Witchcraft trials saw the re-emergence of ordeals, which 
had been out of use since the Middle Ages, such as the trial of water. 
3.5. the Admissibility of evidence in the modern erA criminAl ProceedinGs
During the Enlightenment period, all stages of the French judicial 
process, including sentencing, were closed to the public, as it was the case 
in most European countries. The knowledge of the collected evidence 
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was a privilege of the accuser. Under the Criminal Ordinance of 1670, 
the accused did not have access to evidentiary proceedings, did not know 
accusers, witnesses or the content of their testimonies, could not invoke 
any defences until the trial was completed, and was deprived of the right 
to legal representation. The magistrate, on the other hand, could admit 
any evidence submitted by the prosecution, even anonymous proof. The 
judge independently established the facts, notifying the accused. The judge 
questioned the accused once, before making the judgment. The accused 
was still treated as an object rather than a subject of the criminal process.
The rule that criminal proceedings should be conducted in camera 
and in writing was a consequence of the principle that the determination 
of the truth was the sole prerogative of the sovereign and the judges 
appointed by the sovereign. After all, the supreme authority, including 
the right to impose criminal penalties, could not be left in the hands of 
commoners. Another byproduct of procedural secrecy was a strict system 
of formal evidence. The essence and procedural value of evidence were 
defined by a long-standing tradition dating back to medieval times. As late 
as in the 18th century, proofs were classified as real, direct and formal; 
indirect, circumstantial and presumptive; and also as evident, considerable 
and non-considerable.42 In principle, the formal restrictions placed on 
evidence-taking were a means of the internal regulation of the absolute 
power that applied the law for its exclusive use.
Torture was a legitimate method of evidence-taking. As such, 
torture, independently from the “modern” inquisitive methods, was a 
living relic of the ancient probative methods such as ordeals, judicial duels 
or other “God’s judgments”. According to the procedure, if the accused 
endured torture and did not confess, the accuser was obliged to drop 
the charges. A consequence of the above rule was the custom, prevailing 
in cases of most serious offences, of ordering torture, but “subject to 
evidence”. In such a case, upon the conclusion of torture, the judge was 
still allowed to adjudicate based on presumptions to prevent the accused’s 
acquittal. This procedure offered the accused the “advantage” of being 
protected against capital punishment. 
42 See: JOUSSE, Daniel. Traite de la justice criminelle. Paris: Debure 1771, p. 660.
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The Austrian Franciscana, or the Book of Laws on Felonies and 
Grave Police Offences, enacted on 3 September 1803, emphasised the 
principle of “legal belief”, expressed in the admissible finding of the 
accused’s guilt based on certain rules of evidence despite the absence 
of the accused’s confession. The new codification did not abolish the 
theory of legal evidence in Austrian criminal procedure, but the accused’s 
admission of guilt was no longer the conclusive evidence. 
Furthermore, under the Prussian Criminal Ordinance (Preussische 
Criminalordnung) of 1805, the obsolete “positive” form of the theory 
of legal evidence continued to govern the assessment of evidence. 
Accordingly, proofs were divided into complete, incomplete and less 
than incomplete (i.e. doubtful).
3.6. the admIssIbIlIty In france In the napoleon bonaparte era
The Code of Criminal Procedure (Code d ‘instruction criminelle) 
adopted in France on 16 December 1808 marked the beginning of a new 
era in the history of the European criminal process. Under the 1808 
Code, anyone who had knowledge of a crime or its circumstances could 
serve as a witness. The hearing of witnesses by the judge during the 
investigation took place in camera and in the absence of the accused (art. 
73). Before starting to testify, witnesses took an oath that they would tell 
the truth and only the truth. Pursuant to art. 322 of the Code, the following 
persons could not testify as witnesses: (1) father, mother, grandfather, 
grandmother and ascendants of the accused or a co-accused; (2) sons, 
daughters, grandchildren or ascendants of any of them; (3) brothers 
and sisters; (4) persons related by affinity in the first or second degree; 
(5) husband and wife, also divorced; 6) denunciators (whistleblowers, 
informants) paid for their services; unpaid denunciators could appear 
before the court as witnesses, but the court had to instruct the jury of 
their status (art. 323). Testimony given by the aforementioned persons 
was nevertheless valid provided that the prosecutor, the aggrieved person 
and the accused made no objection. 
Napoleon Bonaparte introduced restrictions on certain persons’ 
capacity to become a witness. In art. 510 of the Code, he stipulated that 
“the Princes and Princesses of Imperial Blood, the Grand Dignitaries 
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of the State, and the Grand Judge the Minister of Justice shall not be 
summoned to appear as witnesses, even at a trial before the assembly of 
juries, unless the Emperor, at the request of a party and after obtaining 
the report of the Grand Judge, by special decree, gives His approval for 
their appearance”. 
4.  the contemporary dIscussIon of the rules on admIssIbIlIty 
of evIdence In crImInal process 
The concept of “admissible evidence” is currently under 
discussion in the European science of evidence and case law. The core 
of this discussion is the question of whether evidence obtained illegally 
can be deemed admissible. In fact, illegality in obtaining evidence should 
trigger relevant procedural sanctions including declaring it null and void 
or ineffective.
It is noted in the debate that the state is obliged to ensure the 
safety of its citizens. The state should introduce effective measures aimed 
at preventing and combating crime. The obligation to ensure the safety 
of citizens means that the state can, or even – if the circumstances of a 
given case so require – has to, resort to obtaining evidence in an unlawful 
manner. Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the notion of admitting 
illegally obtained evidence has been expressed more often. The opinion is 
expressed that in extreme situations it is necessary to obtain testimonies 
by violence, especially in “ticking-bomb” scenarios. There are even more 
far-reaching proposals to legalise and institutionalise the use of torture. 
However, supporters of this view note that such drastic measures are 
exceptional and allowed only in extreme situations and that torture is 
only to be applied under supervision and must be governed by legally 
defined procedures43. In Germany, the discussion revolved around the 
use of physical and psychological violence by police officer Wolfgang 
43 See: SLATER. Jerome. Tragic Choices in the War on Terrorism: Should We 
Try to Regulate and Control Torture? Political Science Quarterly, v. 121, no. 2, 
p. 191-215, 2006. DERSHOWITZ, Alan M. Is There a Torturous Road to Jus-
tice?, Los Angeles Times, 8.11.2001; DERSHOWITZ, Alan M. Why terrorism 
works: Understanding the threat, responding to the challenge. Yale University 
Press, 2002, p. 131-164.
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Daschner in connection with the abduction of the son of a well-known 
financier by Magnus Gäfgen44. In a “ticking bomb” scenario, violence is 
used against the accused in order to save or protect the life and health of 
other people. Opponents of violent evidence-taking measures counter 
the above rationale for extorting evidence by pointing to the ultimate 
value, namely the inherent dignity of a human being.
The necessity for the state authorities to maintain lawful forms 
of action is quoted in opposition to the views justifying the admission 
of unlawfully obtained evidence. After all, the authorities are obliged 
to act on the basis and within the boundaries of the law. The principle 
of legality governing the actions of authorities, as expressed in most 
European constitutions, prescribes the respect for and compliance with 
legal forms and methods of obtaining evidence in the criminal process. 
The ECtHR expressed the view that the use of evidence obtained 
directly as a result of torture always makes the criminal process unreliable. 
In the judgment of the Grand Chamber in the case Jalloh v. Germany 
the Court stated that: “... incriminating evidence – whether in the form 
of a confession or real evidence – obtained as a result of acts of violence or 
brutality or other forms of treatment which can be characterised as torture – 
should never be relied on as proof of [the victim’s] guilt, irrespective of its 
probative value. Any other conclusion would only serve to legitimate indirectly 
the sort of morally reprehensible conduct which the authors of Article 3 
of the [European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms] sought to proscribe or, as it was so well put in the 
United States Supreme Court’s judgment in the Rochin case, [...] to “afford 
brutality the cloak of law”45.
44 See: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 1 June 2010, 
Gäfgen v Germany, no. 22978/05. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
45 See: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 11 July 2006, 
Jalloh v Germany, no. 54810/00, §105. The same view was expressed in: EU-
ROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 21 September, Söylemez 
v Turkey, no. 46661/99, § 122; see also: GRAFFIN, Niel. The Legal conse-
quences of Ill-treating Detainees held for Police Questioning in Breach of 
Article 3 ECHR. European Journal of Current Legal Issues, v. 20, no. 2, p. 5-6, 
2014, http://webjcli.org/article/view/339/437.
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The said opinion has been repeated in other judgments.46 In El 
Haski v. Belgium, the ECtHR reiterated that the use of evidence obtained 
by torture and by inhuman or degrading treatment in criminal proceedings 
automatically renders the trial, as a whole, unreliable. The same standard 
should be applied to material evidence obtained directly through the use 
of torture47. It is irrelevant here whether the evidence obtained as a result 
of torture or inhuman treatment played a significant role in the making of 
a factual finding. The very fact of admitting such evidence to the criminal 
process is a factor determining the unreliability of the entire proceedings48. 
Evidentiary prohibitions set out in Article 3 of the Convention are absolute 
in nature and have cross-border implications. Hence, it is unacceptable to 
use evidence (testimonies of witnesses’ or the accused) obtained through 
international legal assistance from a person interviewed in another country 
with the use of torture or inhuman treatment.
According to the ECtHR, narrowly understood evidentiary 
prohibitions also apply to the evidence obtained as a result of a faulty 
fictitious transaction, which constitutes incitement of the accused to 
commit a prohibited act. The ECtHR has expressed such a position in 
Ramanauskas v. Lithuania. The Court held that “where an accused asserts 
that he was incited to commit an offence, the criminal courts must carry out 
a careful examination of the material in the file, since for the trial to be fair 
within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, all evidence obtained 
as a result of police incitement must be excluded. This is especially true 
where the police operation took place without a sufficient legal framework 
or adequate safeguards.”49 The Court also found that where a national 
court establishes that the accused was incited to commit a prohibited act 
imputed to them, the Court will be obliged to exclude evidence obtained 
as a result of police provocation that was improperly carried out. In other 
46 Cf. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 1 June 2010, Gäf-
gen v Germany, no. 22978/05, §§ 166-167.
47 See: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 25 September 
2012, El Haski v Belgium, no. 649/08, § 85. 
48 See: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 11 February 
2014, Cěsnieks v Latvia, no. 9278/06, § 62-70.
49 See: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 5 February 2008, 
Ramanauskas v Lithuania, no. 74420/01, § 60. 
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judgments, the ECtHR pointed to the obligation to exclude such evidence 
from the criminal process or apply a “procedure with similar consequences”50.
5.  the axIologIcal foundatIons of the rules on admIssIbIlIty 
of evIdence In crImInal proceedIngs
It is noted in the ongoing debate that if the principle of legality 
of the actions of authorities, the principle of respect for inherent human 
dignity, legal protection of individual freedoms and rights, including the 
right to privacy, and the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and the use of corporal punishment are introduced into national 
legal systems, then the authorities of the state should respect these 
principles. It is pointed out that the history of law provides numerous 
examples of the fact that a sovereign is obliged to respect the law that 
they have established. In the early Middle Ages (until 1100) there was 
a principle, expressed as a moral obligation, that the king rules within 
the law inherited from his ancestors and is obliged to respect that law. 
This obligation was reiterated in early medieval Christian writings. Saint 
Ambrose (c. 340-397), Bishop of Milan, claimed that kings were not 
subject to criminal law but nevertheless emphasized that the ruler should 
observe the laws he had established51. 
In the late Middle Ages St. Thomas recommended that the ruler 
obeyed the law on account of his moral duty. In distinguishing between 
the “coercive” and “directive” force of the law, St. Thomas expressed 
the view that “when it comes to the directive force of the law, the ruler 
50 See: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of April 2014, La-
gutin and Others v Russia, no. 6228/09, 19123/09, 19678/07, 52340/08 and 
7451/09, § 117; Also: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment 
of 9 June 1998, Teixeira de Castro v Portugal, no. 44/1997/828/1034, §§ 
34-36; EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 26 October, 
Khudobin v Russia, no. 59696/00, § 135; EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS. Judgment of 15 December 2005, Vanyan v Russia, no. 53203/99, § 
46-47; EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Judgment of 2 December 
2014, Taraneks v Latvia, no. 3082/06, § 60. 
51 See: AMBROSE OF MILANO. Epistulae, 21.9, where he wrote: “the emper-
or makes laws, so let him be an example of respect for that law”; see also: 
ISIDORE OF SEVILLE. Sententiae, 3.51.
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surrenders to the law of his own free will”. As Thomas Aquinas said, that 
is why it had been stated in the Decrees of Gregory that “whoever obliges 
the other by the law that has been issued should himself respect that 
law. And the Sage teaches further: ‘hold on to the law that you yourself 
have established’”52.
During the Renaissance, Jean Gerson53 indicated that the king 
may not kill anybody without applying the rules of due process of law 
(iuris ordine) and that the king may not take the life of anyone who has 
not been charged, brought to court and convicted. “The monarch and 
prelate, although they are usually said to be free from the binding force 
of the law (solutus legibus), should respect the law they have established 
to set an example to their subjects”54.
During the Enlightenment, Jean Bodin55, the greatest contemporary 
supporter of the absolute monarchy, claimed that the quintessence of 
sovereignty was that the sovereign should not be bound by any laws. 
Nevertheless, he believed that the kingdom should be governed, as far 
as possible (quantum fieri poterit), by laws rather than by the arbitrary 
will of the ruler. Beccaria, Montesquieu and Voltaire protested against 
the arbitrariness of governmental power. J. Locke also wrote about the 
need for the monarch to respect the law56. Notably, in the 18th century, 
the arbitrariness of the government that went beyond the law because of 
the alleged existence of royal prerogative was the reason for the action 
52 See: TOMASZ Z AKWINU. Summa teologiczna. Prawo, I-II, q. 96.5., v. 13, p. 
86, Londyn 1986.
53 Jean Gerson (1363-1429), Rector of the University of Paris, philosopher, 
reformer.
54 See: GERSON, Jean. Summa contra Ioannem Parisiensem (Opera, 1.11.152). 
In: KELLY, John M. Historia zachodniej teorii prawa. p. 199, Kraków 2006; 
KELLY, John M. A short history of western legal theory. Oxford University 
Press, 1992.
55 Jean Bodin (1530-1596), theoretician of the state, creator of the ideology of 
French absolutism, supporter of absolute monarchy. His ideas became the 
basis of absolute monarchy in France. His best-known work is The Six Books 
of the Republic. In the treaty entitled De la démonomanie des sorciers (Of the 
Demon-mania of the Sorcerers) Bodin recommended extremely brutal meth-
ods of punishing alleged witches.
56 See: LOCKE, John. Dwa traktaty o rządzie. London 1690, p. 310.
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taken in England against the Stuarts and the beheading of King Charles 
I and dethronement of King James II.
It is argued that the law is based on specific axiology. A set of 
axiological values is contained implicitly or explicitly in or outside the 
system of law to which it refers. The set of these values constitutes the 
moral basis of the law. Currently, in the European legal culture, human 
rights, including the right to a fair trial, are an important element of this set.
6. conclusIons 
Bearing in mind the values expressed in the constitutions of 
the countries of continental Europe or in the preambles to these acts as 
well as those laid down in legal instruments of the European Union and 
the Council of Europe, which form part of national legal systems, one 
should say that justice, truth, freedom and inherent dignity of a human 
being constitute the axiological basis of the criminal process. They are 
the primary values of the criminal process. Recognising these values 
as fundamental values necessitate organising the criminal process in a 
way that would ensure that these values are respected and protected. 
Inherent human dignity must be protected fully and unconditionally. 
The remaining values, i.e. justice, truth and freedom are not absolute in 
nature and may be restricted according to the criteria laid down by the 
proportionality principle.
The fairness of the judicial (criminal) process refers to what is 
known as “procedural fairness”. In accordance with the procedural fairness 
principle, the process is fair as long as it provides for guarantees of the 
parties to the proceedings. The essence of procedural fairness is the seeking 
of justice (a fair outcome) by means of properly designed procedural 
provisions that duly protect parties’ rights. In the criminal process, 
procedural fairness requires that procedural provisions be developed in 
a way conducive to achieving a fair outcome in the most effective way 
possible. The implementation of the procedural fairness principle creates 
the presumption of a fair outcome on the object of the process (i.e. on 
the guilt of the accused). In such a case, it would be difficult to consider 
a court decision to be procedurally fair if the evidence of the accused’s 
guilt had been obtained unlawfully.
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It should be added that the axiological basis of a legal system on 
which a legal order is based determines not only the direction of law-making 
but also the interpretation and application of laws. It is, therefore, the 
responsibility of the national authorities of continental Europe, including 
the criminal justices bodies, to construe the law in a pro-constitutional 
and pro-EU manner and apply the law in accordance with these values.
One should also recall the aforementioned requirement of 
foreseeability of court decisions. As a side note, one should remember that 
the period preceding the 19th century’s legal codifications is considered 
to be the era of absent legal certainty. The reasons for this absence were 
the chaotic structure of legal authorities, particularism, the confusedness 
and ambiguity of customary laws, which led to arbitrary court decisions. 
It was hoped that the much-needed codification of law would result in 
developing a uniform body of law that would contain ready-to-use and 
accessible solutions. The law as a system was meant to be simple, coherent 
and complete57.
Nowadays, calls for legal certainty in the countries of continental 
Europe are made for reasons other than those quoted in the pre-codification 
period. Generally speaking, the causes of historical legal uncertainty have 
already been eliminated. It is now clear who makes the law and how it is 
made and the law itself is based on socially acceptable rules, principles 
and standards such as the right to a court or the right to a fair (honest) and 
impartial trial. However, this does not mean that the law is entirely certain. 
Whereas the pre-codification postulate of foreseeability of the law centred 
on abstractly expressed foreseeability, nowadays the foreseeability of the 
law, or rather of decisions to apply the law, is perceived in concrete terms. 
The parties have the right to assume that evidentiary proceedings in the 
criminal process will be carried out in accordance with legal principles 
and rules. They should expect that evidence-taking procedures will be 
performed in a way defined in the law and that only the legally admissible 
57 See: CANALE, Damiano. The Many Faces of the Codification of Law in Mod-
ern Continental Europe. In: PATTARO, Enrico, CANALE Damiano, GROSSI, 
Paolo, HOFMANN, Hasso, RILEY, Patrick (Eds.). A History of the Philosophy 
of Law in the Civil Law World, 1600-1900. Series A Treatise of Legal Philoso-
phy and General Jurisprudence. Netherlands: Springer 2009, p. 137. Online 
ISBN 978-90-481-2964-5.
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evidence will be taken. They should be able to anticipate that the rules 
of law will be interpreted holistically, in accordance with the principles 
of interpretation and according to the pro-constitutional and pro-EU 
interpretation and that similar cases will be decided in a similar manner. 
If, however, the criminal process involves steps taken without legal basis 
or in direct contravention of law, inadmissible evidence is collected and 
taken and the law is interpreted so as to justify illegal actions by authorities 
and violations of constitutional principles and values, the parties will 
have none ability whatsoever to predict the final outcome of their case.
One of the arguments raised in the ongoing debate concerns 
the requirement to preserve the moral integrity of the justice system. It 
is argued that the criminal process is a social tool and as such requires 
adequate legitimacy. Its existence is closely linked with the primary values 
of a given legal system. Thus, one should never allow for a discrepancy 
between the declared principles and actual actions of state bodies. The 
above assertion is crucial for the justice system since the authority to 
administer justice may only reasonably be invoked where the body 
enforcing compliance with the law itself respects the law. This means 
that the rules of the “procedural game” should be seen on an equal 
footing with the pursuit of the objectives of the criminal process defined 
in substantive law.58 Arguments referring to the postulate of the moral 
legitimacy of the justice system also refer to the notion that the rights 
and freedoms of an individual form a coherent system. A violation of 
these rights and freedoms results in a violation of the right to a fair trial. 
The effectiveness of human rights requires proper guarantees, i.e. the 
possibility of disqualifying illegally obtained evidence.59 Accordingly, 
the question arises whether the judging of the accused’s behaviour and 
determination of the accused’s guilt (in other words, the administration 
of justice on behalf of the state) can be reconciled with permitting and 
accepting the use of fruits (benefits) of illegal activities of state bodies.60
58 See: ASHWORTH, Andrew. Exploring the integrity principle in evidence and 
procedure. In: MIRFIELD, Peter. SMITH, Roger. Essays for Colin Tapper. Ox-
ford-New York 2003, p. 110.
59 Ibid. 115-116.
60 See: CHAU, Peter. Excluding Integrity? Revisiting Non-Consequentialist Jus-
tifications for Excluding Improperly Obtained Evidence in Criminal Trials. 
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The postulate of the moral integrity of the justice system is 
procedural in its nature. It is linked to the (substantive) values that 
constitute the axiological basis of a given legal system. This postulate may 
not be fulfilled if there is a discrepancy between the declared principles 
and the actions taken as well as an inconsistency in a given system that 
manifests itself in the divergent behaviour of those acting within the system’s 
framework. It is important insofar as invoking the requirement of the moral 
legitimacy of the justice system requires detachment from prevailing and 
changing social expectations. Nowadays, the people of continental Europe 
quite universally accept that the law may be infringed in connection with 
the prevention and combating of crime and, more generally, the protection 
of public safety. Societies approve actions taken by state bodies such as 
the use of prohibited methods of obtaining evidence. This is evidenced by, 
among other things, the views and arguments expressed in Germany in 
connection with the aforementioned case of Wolfgang Daschner61.
It is also pointed out that the argument concerning the moral 
integrity of the justice system should be reformulated into an argument 
based on the prohibition of profiting from illegal activity. The latter assumes 
that a key aspect of the disqualification of illegally obtained evidence is the 
assessment of whether such evidence, if admitted, would be procedurally 
beneficial to a party (basically, the prosecution) who requests the admission. 
If this is the case, the evidence should be disqualified.62 This approach 
deviates from the postulate of moral integrity of the justice system, although 
it is also based on the systemic assumption that one may not derive benefits 
from activities that are prohibited within a given system. 
In conclusion, it is worth noting that the term “inadmissible 
evidence” should be understood broadly. Not only the evidence that is 
In: HUNTER, Jill. ROBERTS, Paul. YOUNG, Simon. DIXON, David (Eds.) 
The Integrity of Criminal Process: From Theory into Practice. Oxford-Portland 
2016, p. 275-277.
61 See: ESSLINGER, Detlef. Mildes Urteil im Folter-Prozess, Süddeutsche Zei-
tung, 21.12.2004. See also public opinion polls carried out in Germany by the 
Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach,Darf die Polizei Gewalt androhen, um 
Leben zu retten? Die große Mehrheit der Bevölkerung sagt: “Ja”, Allensbacher 
Berichte, v. 6, 2004.
62 CHAU, Peter. Excluding Integrity?...
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subject to a statutory prohibition of evidence-taking is inadmissible but also 
any evidence that has unlawfully been obtained. It is debatable whether 
such evidence should be disqualified based on any discrepancy with the 
applicable law or whether such disqualification should be reserved for 
infringements of certain, particularly significant norms expressing the 
fundamental values of a given legal system or infringements of a specific 
degree (severity). It seems that a position advocating strict observance of 
the law by state authorities should prevail. Any attempt to relativize this 
phenomenon will always lead to more opportunities for legal violations 
and illegal activities, in line with Gresham’s Law that “bad money drives 
out good”. Indeed, bad law will always drive out good law.
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